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Introduction
Will we ever run out of energy?
To ask the question, is to answer it. Most of us have all too much experience 
of running out of time or space but not of energy, unless it’s the physical kind- 
perhaps after a long day at work. 
And yet, worldwide, energy policy is imbued with pessimism. The strong con-
viction is that population and economic growth are so great that not only 
will we run out of hydrocarbons, minerals or land before technology can save 
us from an impending climatic apocalypse but probably all three will run out 
simultaneously - and soon. 
Yet as we will discover, the real constraint is not our finite physical energy 
resources, but human intervention of the statist kind. 
A careful look at the history, present and future of our energy supply paints a 
much more positive picture. Over hundreds of years, some crucial megatrends 
are clear; increasing consumption, progressive decarbonisation, the emergence 
of energy service clouds and a growth in the breadth of energy ownership and 
consumer choice. 
So what does the history tell us?
Megatrend 1: Rising Energy Consumption
Since the end of World War Two, there has been a six-fold increase in global 
energy consumption from approximately 100 to 600 exajoules per year. Back 
in 1820, it was approximately 20. This is a huge increase driven by population 
growth and more particularly, the nature of new economic demand. Perhaps 
one modern analogy would be to compare energy consumption growth with 
the early introduction of the dial-up internet. I can remember in the late 1990s 
being very pleased at having an upgrade from a 16k to a 48k dial up modem. 
Today of course, the norm is closer to 5 MB and in countries like South Korea, 
something like 18. The point here is that the more energy we have, the more 
6we can do with it. Energy – like internet bandwidth – is an economic input; 
and there are billions of people who will want more.
Megatrend 2: Decarbonisation
Hard as it may seem to appreciate for many greens, a breakdown of the fuel 
we use for energy consumption demonstrates a long term trend towards decar-
bonisation, at least by breakdown rather than quantity. This is a simple matter 
of chemistry – how much carbon there is per unit of fuel relative to the com-
bustible amount of hydrogen – driven by economic necessity. 
Hundreds of years ago, pretty much the only fuel was wood which has ten 
carbon atoms for every single hydrogen atom. Wood energy of course was also 
augmented by human labour, draught animals and water power. During these 
years global economic growth was roughly less than one percent per year. 
Huge progress came with the Industrial Revolution which was based on coal 
containing two carbon atoms for every single hydrogen atom. For the first 
time, very great heat could be generated, fuelled by almost limitless quanti-
ties of coal which is essential to large-scale iron and steel production. Clearly, 
without coal, there would have been no industrial revolution – there simply 
wasn’t enough charcoal available to fire the furnaces. 
At the turn of the 20th century, another major step towards decarbonisation 
came with oil. Oil contains just one carbon atom to every two hydrogen atoms. 
Germany of course developed the Fischer-Tropsch process that allowed it to 
extract oil from coal and in so doing prolonged its war efforts after the loss of 
the Caucasus. Equally, South Africa during the time of apartheid, was able to 
keep functioning as an economy despite a large number of sanctions. 
The next major step in decarbonisation from oil to gas has been a little bit slow 
in coming. Natural gas or methane – CH4 – could have played a role  a couple 
of decades before the late 1960s in the USA. Arguably, in certain countries this 
last decarbonisation step has been held back because of vested coal interests 
and today, powerful nuclear and renewable advocates. It is a great irony that 
today, thanks to green scepticism of shale gas in Europe, coal consumption 
and CO2 emissions are going up. This is because US Shale gas has driven gas 
prices so low that American power buyers have been dumping coal they were 
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contracted to buy on world markets, undermining the cost-case for natural gas 
in Europe at a stroke – even including the legislated carbon costs. Nonethe-
less, huge deposits of yet to be exploited shale gas have been found outside of 
America and Canada which will accelerate the move away from coal. 
The final trend of course for decarbonisation is, and will probably continue to 
be, from gas to nuclear and renewables and other energy technologies yet to 
be invented, or those brought to market at a reasonable price. As incomes rise, 
the demand for cleaner energy generally rises too. Arguably however what has 
undone this final stage of transition has been the introduction of government 
subsidies that picked winners and reduced innovation right across the tech-
nology spectrum. Today’s current crop of subsidised, renewable energy tech-
nologies – wind, solar and biomass – are anything but game-changers. They 
are simply too intermittent and land-intensive to have a proper displacement 
effect. Equally, Europe’s post-war nuclear boom led by France that peaked in 
the 70s, has since gone awry. And yet, it is in parts of the world where eco-
nomic growth is highest that progress is being made. China has 25 gigawatts 
of nuclear power under construction with a further staggering 180 gigawatts 
planned or proposed. 
Of course, none of these transitions have been smooth and in many countries 
they have gone into reverse. Germany, in the wake of Fukushima, has elected 
to close down all its nuclear power stations, presumably out of fear of a tidal 
wave reaching Munich, and is now planning to build additional coal-fired sta-
tions to make up for the power shortfall. However, all too many people neg-
lect the impact of hydropower, a 160 year old renewable technology that still 
creates fractionally more power than nuclear worldwide.
Overall, there is still a very long-term trend towards decarbonisation. 
Megatrend 3:  The Emergence of Electricity 
to Energy Service Clouds
With the emergence of electricity came the first utilities and their related ser-
vices. Electricity, a carrier of energy, ultimately made possible what is some-
times called the Second Industrial Revolution from the mid 19th century to 
1939, powering equipment and electronics. Today we hear much about cloud 
8computing being the new thing but this is actually a much older business idea 
than commonly appreciated. Back in 1878, Thomas Edison created the first 
utility with a 6 megawatt power plant in New York. For the first time, those 
businesses in the surrounding area were able to buy in electricity as a service 
from the cloud, rather than produce it themselves in their own basements. In 
just one year, Edison had 500 customers buying in this electricity.
Megatrend 4:  Growth in Breadth of Energy 
Ownership & Consumer Choice
The decentralisation and increasing availability of energy services has had 
a profound impact on our energy supplies. They are on a long-term trend to 
democratisation. At the beginning, in hunter gatherer societies, there was no 
ownership of the prime energy source, namely wood. Later, with the emergence 
of farming, monopoly ownership of land assets was established and largely 
kept within tight family structures. Moving rapidly forward to the 20th centu-
ry, a number of states took ownership of oil, gas and coal in order to generate 
tax revenue. In the late 20th century, cash-strapped and/or pioneering states 
started to sell back these assets into private hands, often via the stock-market. 
This greatly increased the breadth of ownership of energy assets. Nonetheless, 
they were often still monopolies. The next stage was set for unbundling – an 
area where EU governance has done very well.
Unbundling ultimately delivers greater consumer choice by breaking down ver-
tically-integrated monopolies. A real world example of why this matters is the 
infamous Enron case – an American energy, commodities and services company 
that was declared bankrupt in 2002 after being exposed for accounting fraud 
and other irregularities. In extremis, when an electricity producer is owned by 
a power supplier you get an “Enron situation” (see the film, “The Smartest Guys 
in the Room”), i.e. the electricity traders phone up the power station operators 
telling them to shut down the plant so they can sell an electricity contract at 
a greater profit in an undersupplied market – this actually happened!
No one is actually suggesting that this occurs today in the EU and the EU has 
made great strides here through pushing the unbundling agenda, but there is 
still precious little downward price pressure from competition which would 
help EU consumers secure energy at a lower price. 
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Of course, we still have many energy monopolies including OPEC, state owner-
ship and a lot of state-regulated investment but the long term trend – driven 
by efficiency - has been and will continue to be a growth in the breadth of 
ownership and consumer choice. 
Megatrend 5: Increasing Capital Efficiency of Energy
The next megatrend that is consistent throughout history is the increasing 
capital efficiency of energy that runs hand in hand with the growth in energy 
consumption. Each year there is economic growth, nations become slightly 
better at deriving more economic output from each unit of energy input. This 
is best measured by dollars of output per barrel of oil equivalent input. These 
results – by country - from 2005 may be quite surprising to some. 
ranking Country Dollars of output per Barrel of oil equivalent
1 Hong Kong 1,554
2 Switzerland 1,292
3 Japan 1,272
4 Denmark 1,179
5 Irland 1,097
6 Uruguay 1,014
7 United Kingdom 940
8 Israel 881
9 Italy 827
10 Austria 819
Source: Future Energy Strategies based on World Bank data.
The results tend to favour wealthy nations with a high population density 
that do not have to endure extreme hot or cold temperatures plus nations 
that do not have a lot of energy-intensive heavy industry. So the UK for exa-
mple, scores quite highly but not because it is populated by a virtuous people, 
very concerned with their energy efficiency. It is simply because the climate 
is mild, commuting journeys are short and much of the working population 
is concentrated in the southern half of England and employed in service in-
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dustries. Meanwhile, at the bottom, you will find nations like North Korea or 
some African nations, perhaps producing around $200 or less for every barrel 
of oil equivalent.
As alluded to earlier, you cannot separate rising energy consumption from eco-
nomic growth through greater energy efficiency. It has never been done. The 
additional money from GDP growth rebounds as an additional economic input 
and becomes an indirect additional energy input. As William Stanley Jevons 
espoused in his 1865 book The Coal Question,
„It is a confusion of ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equiva-
lent to diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth.“
It has since become known as the Jevons Paradox (i.e that technological progress 
that increases the efficiency with which a resource is used, tends to increase 
- rather than decrease - the rate of consumption of that resource).
In modern parlance, micro-savings at the consumer level by switching off lights 
and TV standby switches, simply rebound in the wider macro-economy. That’s 
why the only event that consistently reduces overall energy consumption is 
a recession – almost always caused by a collapse in the money supply which 
reduces available capital for energy use.
The threats and constraints to our energy supply today
So now we have established some long-run historical trends, the question is 
what are the actual threats to our energy supplies today?
Perhaps the most underrated threat is the financial weakness of our utility 
companies – those who would invest in our future energy supplies. Across 
Europe, they are highly indebted and simply cannot raise the funds to pay for 
all the green investments our politicians would have them do. These compa-
nies have to decide on the balance between dividends and investment that 
will deliver the best value to their shareholders. Today, these balance sheets 
are painfully lopsided. Indeed, they are in such dire straits that according to 
Citi research EU Utilities were the worst performing sector in 2010, 2011 and 
2012. The debt matters because it reduces the quantity of investment capital 
available and increases borrowing costs. Arguably, this is what has made nu-
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clear construction so much more expensive. The fully privatised cost of capital 
for a nuclear plant in Western Europe is now expected to be in the region of 
15% - not that much different from a credit card.
According to Peter Atherton, until recently, Chief Utility Analyst at Citi, EU 
Energy targets were set in 2004-2007. Since then, the following financially 
game-changing events have happened:
– Banking financial crises
– Utility sector credit downgrades
– Sovereign credit crises
– Collapse in value of renewable manufacturing companies
– Rise in renewable costs
– Poor load factor performance data from wind in Europe
– Fukushima
– Tax grab on sector by government
–  Recession and reduced demand
– Carbon price collapse
– US shale gas energy revolution
– Falling energy demand
– Green jobs myth
This collection of largely negative circumstances does not bode well for a rapid 
recovery in the balance sheets of the utilities. In fact, they seem set to conti-
nue going deeper into the red. Amongst the worst affected are E.ON, EdF, RWE 
and Iberdrola which have a combined net debt position of approximately EUR 
140 billion. This presents them with three choices:
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I) Raise prices to customers and hope they will pay
II) Cut investment and repair balance sheets
III) Change EU energy policy
Only the last two are realistic options and the second will come first. And yet 
making any of these choices is made difficult by another constraint on our 
energy supplies;
Believing in Politicians, Energy CEOs and Received Opinion
Politicians unfortunately have a poor record in intervening in energy markets; 
and they show no remorse or humility when they are proven to be wrong. Per-
manence is the illusion of every age and while there will be no end, no final 
point in our energy history or technology, this is lost on our energy policy-
making politicians. Nowhere is this more obvious than with EU energy targets. 
Europe’s politically-driven energy targets are essentially a 20 year EUR 3 tril-
lion un-hedged futures bet on high and rising fossil fuel prices and the ability 
of renewables to scale up and become cost-effective as a consequence. This 
is one bet that is set to lead to a huge loss.
To be fair, we should not uniquely blame politicians. Even very successful en-
ergy company CEOs like Lee Raymond of Exxon can get the big things wrong. 
In 2005, he said that natural gas production had peaked in America. In eve-
ry subsequent year shale gas has been brought to market in the USA in such 
vast quantities that production has been rising consistently. The fact is that 
all of the big oil and gas companies missed out on the shale gas rush, arriving 
several years too late.
Received opinion meanwhile is the enemy of reason. The human brain’s limited 
processing power copes with large amounts of information by accepting all 
too readily what everyone else in it’s environment believes to be true. It takes 
a lot of effort to disagree and to work out why.
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Constraints of politically preferred energy technologies
With energy technologies, there is always a hierarchy of need. First they must 
be available, second affordable and third environmentally clean. Assuming avai-
lability and a level playing field, the cheapest energy source would win. What 
tends to happen is that politicians seek to redress the balance and skew the 
choice of technology using subsidies towards cleaner sources which invariably 
has a negative impact on cost and availability. Modern day renewables are a 
case in point. Across the Western world, subsidies have been put in place to 
support intermittent renewables that have failed to deliver on scale, financial 
cost or availability and thus have created a further constraint on our energy 
supplies.
Even so, one can sometimes get too carried away with the cost of the actual 
technologies. The cost of the underlying economic system has a much more 
major impact on the final cost to the consumer. For example, the cost of wind 
power per megawatt hour with a subsidy in Texas is approximately 60 dollars 
per megawatt hour. At that price, you could sell into spot European wholesale 
electricity markets where the price is equivalent to approximately 75 dollars 
a megawatt hour and make a lot of money. You could go further and compare 
the cost of nuclear power in France to the cost of nuclear power in Japan. 
They are clearly not the same.
What needs to happen is to give more prominence to measuring the perfor-
mance of energy technologies according to their de-rated capacity margins. 
De-rated capacity margins are the measure that national grids use to measure 
the effective, reliable contribution at any time. They are measured as a percen-
tage of the installed capacity that they can be relied on to produce – 100% of 
the time. And they make uncomfortable reading for some green enthusiasts.
Derated Capacity Margins by Technology:
Pumped Storage  100%
Interconnectors  95%
Oil   90%
Nuclear  75%
Coal  70%
Wind  10%
Solar  0%
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Some good news that is happening now
It would be wrong however to conclude that we are doomed to idiotic energy 
policymaking based on flawed assumptions for a long time into the future. 
We are currently experiencing the greatest shift in energy markets for 50 ye-
ars driven by massive discoveries of the world’s shale gas deposits, and led by 
the USA, an economic method to extract them using hydraulic fracturing. So 
immense has been the impact in the USA that natural gas prices that used to 
cost much the same as in Europe a few years ago, now cost 4 times less. This 
is because US natural gas prices have delinked from the oil price that traditi-
onal suppliers like Gazprom would have us use as the basis for a contract. At 
the time of writing, as measured per million British Thermal Units (BTUs), the 
price of natural gas in America is $2.85. In Britain, the National Balancing 
Point is pricing at the equivalent of $10.24 for the same amount of gas. And 
in mainland Europe, it is even slightly higher.
That is why there is so much interest in shale gas in Europe as well as around 
the world. It is about price. But it also offers huge environmental gains over 
coal and oil. Not just because it has a lower carbon content, but, more tangibly 
to asthma sufferers, virtually no particulates or sulphur or nitrous oxides. Al-
ready in the USA, there are a number of public transport vehicles that run on 
natural gas and the city centre air is much cleaner for it.
Another less radical but strategically very important change happening now 
is the successful exploitation of shale oil. With oil prices so high and using 
exactly the same technique to extract shale gas, US-based oil companies have 
found it profitable to bring shale oil to market and boost US oil production at 
the expense of imports. The reason this matters is that until recently, oil was a 
globally fungible commodity that more or less priced the same the world over. 
Since the onset of shale oil production in Eagle Ford and the Bakken the spread 
between Brent Crude and the WTI (West Texas Intermediate) has grown to $20. 
So $92 for WTI and $112 for Brent. Worldwide, as more shale oil and shale gas 
are exploited, this has a long-term impact on the pricing power of OPEC and 
the budget balances of those member states. The re-localisation of oil prices 
and the divergence of gas prices from oil-linked contract is a huge threat to 
the budgets of many Petro-States. That’s why some think we have only seen 
Arab Spring 1. Arab Spring 2 is coming and will be much more convulsive and 
may even lead to new regimes in Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and others. 
But so much for fossil fuels – what of the alternative energy technologies?
 15
Are there any cost-effective trends to watch out for in the near future?
We have touched on the rise of natural gas as a transport fuel with a global 
fleet now numbering some 15 million vehicles.
There is also a new type of nuclear reactor that will soon appear called a small 
modular reactor (SMR). The principal advantage of SMRs is that because they 
are small, perhaps the size of a house, they can be almost mass produced, in-
serted and taken away in a modular fashion as, when and where the demand 
is. Secondly, because they are smaller in size – perhaps 25 – 250 megawatts, 
they are much more affordable. If you want to invest in nuclear power, you 
have to take a view on the future direction of the electricity market and cru-
cially, the future direction of political and electoral sentiment. With massive 
nuclear power plants costing EUR 6 billion, that is a big bet that will require a 
30 year pay-off because most of the costs incurred are up front. With a small 
nuclear reactor fully stocked with fuel for only 10 years before its modular 
replacement and perhaps costing a few hundred million euros or less, this be-
comes much more financeable.
Another way of keeping close tabs on near future developments is to pay at-
tention to which technologies are being patented. Right now, there is a huge 
patent spike in energy storage technology. Typically, patents are registered se-
veral years before the technology matures and reaches the market. The prize for 
energy storage is to store overnight electricity which in many countries costs 
almost nothing and sell it back during the daytime at peak. This arbitrage would 
do much to bring down prices and increase stability to electricity markets.
Nor should we underrate the progress being made in software’s ability to match 
supply and demand faster than ever before.
Conclusion
Many things can interrupt our energy supplies but the constraints are man 
and not nature-made. There is no lack of innovation and imagination. The risks 
are what they have always been – political and financial. In terms of actual 
supply, energy is going to become boring again as the pace of discovery heats 
up. In just a few years we have witnessed the quiet death of the peak oil and 
gas philosophy. But the changes that are coming and which we will not be 
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able to predict, will surely be exciting. As a policy goal, the only sustainable 
way forward is to work much harder at delivering tangible results at lowest 
cost. Only then will consumers, businesses and markets be prepared to keep 
footing the bill.
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